The acquired immunity doctrine is an affirmative defense that may be available to state construction contractors that are sued by a third party for alleged construction plan design defects. Here is the scenario: The Nebraska Department of Transportation (“Department”) contracts with a road contractor to remove and replace part of a state highway. The Department designs the construction plans and requires the contractor to follow the plans as designed. Part of the construction plans include a traffic control plan. The traffic control plan complies with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (“MUTCD”). Traffic control is subcontracted to a traffic control manager. The traffic control subcontractor has no discretion to deviate from the traffic control plan and must set up all traffic devices at the required locations as the Department orders. The subcontractor sets up the traffic devices as the traffic control plan requires.
Subsequently, a third party is injured in the construction zone and alleges that additional or different traffic devices should have been used on the project. The Department retains its sovereign immunity because: 1) the Department’s choice of devices was discretionary, and a matter of engineering judgment; and, 2) under Nebraska’s State Tort Claim Act, the Department retains its sovereign immunity for “Plans for Construction of or improvement to highways.” See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-8,219 (9) & (11) (Reissue 2014). Yet, the subcontractor is sued for the traffic plans’ alleged design defects even though the Department designed the plan and is immune from liability. Can the subcontractor raise the Department’s sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense? The answer is “yes,” and the defense is called the “acquired immunity doctrine.”
The acquired immunity doctrine “provides that a contractor who performs its work according to the terms of its contract with a governmental agency, and under the governmental agency’s direct supervision, is not liable for damages resulting from its performance.” Lopez v. Mendez, 432 F.3d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Smith v. Rogers Group, Inc., 348 Ark. 241, 72 S.W.3d 450, 455 (2002)) (emphasis added). “Thus, if damages result from the contractor’s performance of a construction contract with the state, ‘and the damages result from something inherent in the design and specifications required by the public agency, the contractor is not liable unless he is negligent or guilty of a wrongful tort.’” Lopez, 432 F.3d at 833 (quoting Guerin Contractors, Inc. v. Reaves, 270 Ark. 710, 606 S.W.2d 143, 144 (1980)). “The purpose of the doctrine is to protect an ‘innocent contractor who has completely performed the work to the government’s plans and specifications.’” Lopez, (quoting Smith, 72 S.W.3d at 456).
The Nebraska Supreme Court has not yet adopted the acquired immunity doctrine. But the Supreme Court has adopted the immunity’s fundamental concept. That is, the Supreme Court has said “where a construction contractor follows plans and specifications supplied by the owner which later prove to be defective or insufficient, [the contractor] is not responsible to the owner for loss or damage resulting therefrom as a consequence of the defectiveness or insufficiency of such plans and specifications.” Lindsay Mfg. Co. v. Universal Sur. Co., 246 Neb. 495, 506-07, 519 N.W.2d 530, 539-40 (1994); see also Langel Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc. v. Midwest Bridge & Constr. Co., 213 Neb. 283, 287, 329 N.W.2d 97, 100-01 (1983) (citations omitted); Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irr. Dist. v. Tobin Quarries, Inc., 157 F.2d 482, 485-86 (8th Cir. 1946) (applying Nebraska law); State v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 125 Neb. 43, 50, 248 N.W. 807, 808-09 (1933).
This is the acquired immunity doctrine. Furthermore, although the Nebraska’s State Tort Claims Act excludes independent contractors from the term “state agency,” “the acquired-immunity doctrine creates an exception to this rule.” See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,210(1); see also Lopez, 432 F.3d at 833. The reason for the exception “is to protect an ‘innocent contractor who has completely performed the work to the government’s plans and specifications.’” Lopez, 432 F.3d at 833 (quoting Smith, 72 S.W.3d at 456). In fact, other jurisdictions with tort claims acts like Nebraska’s Act and that have the same “state agency” exclusion for contractors as Nebraska’s Act, still have adopted the acquired immunity doctrine to protect innocent contractors that follow the state’s construction plans. See id. at 833-34 (discussing the acquired immunity doctrine under Arkansas law); see also McLain v. State, 563 N.W.2d 600, 605 (Iowa 1997); Fraker v. C.W. Matthews Contracting Co., Inc., 272 Ga. App. 807, 614 S.E.2d 94 (2005); Garrett Freightlines v. Bannock Paving Co., 112 Idaho 722, 731, 735 P.2d 1033, 1042 (1987).
For example, the Iowa State Tort Claims Act also excludes independent contractors from the term “state agency.” I.C.A § 669.2(5). But the Iowa Supreme Court nevertheless adopted the acquired immunity doctrine to protect its independent contractors from liability. Specifically, in McLain v. State, supra, the plaintiffs sued the State of Iowa, its general contractors, and a subcontractor working in an interstate construction zone. The plaintiffs claimed that the construction zone was unreasonably dangerous because the traffic warning signs failed to warn motorists of traffic congestion. McLain, 563 N.W.2d at 601. The district court granted the general contractor and subcontractor summary judgment under the acquired immunity doctrine and in affirming summary judgment, the Iowa Supreme Court held:
The rule is well established that a contractor for the State is not liable to a third party for damages if the contractor complies with the State’s plans and specifications and is not negligent in performing its work . . . . In other words, in those situations the contractor shares the same immunity as the State.
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Here, the evidence in the record reflects that [the general contractors and subcontractor] complied with all State plans and specifications and did not perform their work in a negligent manner. Throughout the project, the State controlled all decisions regarding the placement and installation of the traffic control devices. [The subcontractor] installed the warning signs as it contracted to, and on the day of the accident, the signs were in their proper locations and in complete working order.
Id. at 605 (citations omitted).
The Iowa court also noted that monitoring the effectiveness of the signs was “part of the decision-making process of whether to install additional signs,” which was a decision retained by the State and immunized by statute. Id. The Iowa Supreme Court then held that “[b]ecause [the general contractors and the subcontractor] complied with the State’s contract specifications, we conclude as a matter of law that they may share immunity with the State . . . .” Id.
Here, like McLain, the subcontractor in our scenario followed the traffic control plan and the traffic plan complied with the MUTCD. Also, the third-party’s claim that the traffic control plan should have included different or additional traffic devices is a claim against the Department because the Department designed the Traffic Plan —not the subcontractor. The Department, however, is immune from liability because: 1) the traffic plan’s design was a matter of engineering judgment; and, 2) the traffic plan was part of the Project’s “Plans for Construction” for a highway improvement. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-8,219 (9) & (11). Thus, the subcontractor is cloaked in the Department’s sovereign immunity because it “complied with all State plans and specifications and did not perform their work in a negligent manner. [And] [t]hroughout the project, the Department controlled all decisions regarding the placement and installation of the traffic control devices.” McLain, 563 N.W.2d at 605.
Now, we need the right case to be taken to the Nebraska Supreme Court. And remember, in Nebraska you can now file an interlocutory appeal on an order denying summary judgment based on the assertion of sovereign immunity. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902.
